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INTRODUCTION
The election of Donald Trump has brought many surprising and far-
reaching policy changes. Particularly dismaying has been his attitude towards 
environmental protection and climate change. He has systematically begun 
to dismantle environmental protections in favor of business efforts, and this 
is nowhere so obvious as in his promotion and protection of the coal industry. 
Indeed, it appears some of his policy initiatives come straight from the hands 
of coal companies.1
Trump campaigned on promotion of coal and extractive industries, and 
one of the clearest ways he is trying to help those industries is by increasing 
the amount of land available for resource extraction. To that end, the 
Administration (largely through the Department of Interior) is working to 
*Professor, SUNY Buffalo Law School and Profesora Visitante, Universidad Pontificia ? Comillas 
(ICADE). Many thanks to Kalyani Robbins, symposium participants, FIU, and members of the Royalty 
Committee that shared their experiences with me. My Buffalo colleagues were insightful when I presented 
part of this research at a faculty workshop. Erin Ryan and Matt Steilen were particularly helpful with the 
sections on federalism, but should not be blamed for the crudeness of my analysis. Early conversations 
with Michael Blumm helped shape the essay and inform my larger research agenda, and he deserves my 
thanks. 
1 See Lisa Friedman, Donald Trump Accused of Treating Coal Baron Robert Murray’s Wishes for 
Mining Sector Like a ‘To Do List’, INDEPENDENT (Jan. 10, 2018), 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/donald-trump-coal-mining-environmental-
regulations-rollback-robert-murray-wish-list-fossil-fuels-a8151556.html (detailing Murray?s impressive 
level of presidential access and influence). 
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remove environmental protection for lands, shortcut environmental review 
processes, and facilitate the issuance of mining permits and energy leases. 
When adopting these policies, the Trump Administration sometimes 
acknowledges that it is working to promote energy extraction businesses, but 
also often suggests that changing policy efforts are based on a desire to give 
states more power in controlling natural resources within their borders. In 
this way, President Trump can argue that he is working to promote his 
federalist ideals as a mask for his cronyism.2
This essay examines changes in policies regarding coal extraction from 
the Obama Administration to the Trump Administration. Section I discusses 
patterns and debates regarding control of natural resource federalism, 
examining the Trump Administration?s platform of shifting more resources 
to local control. Section II describes federal coal-leasing policy, tracing the 
efforts begun by the Obama Administration followed by the policy changes 
being implemented by the Trump Administration. Section III illustrates that 
the Trump Administration is making resource management decisions from a 
different perspective compared to earlier presidential administrations, with 
more benefit focused on business and industry groups than on individuals. 
As with previous republican administrations, the Trump Whitehouse has 
announced a policy strongly favoring states? rights and suggests its 
management decisions are stemming from that principled stance. Spoiler 
alert: they aren?t. The piece concludes by revisiting some of the statutes and 
principles that underlie the rules for natural resource management to assess 
whether the Trump Administration is complying with the sentiments that 
form the basis for the rules. Spoiler alert: it isn?t. 
I. NATURAL RESOURCES FEDERALISM
Federalism is generally the term we use when discussing the delicate (or 
sometimes not so delicate) balance between federal and state action. A 
continuous debate in our country surrounds which rights should belong to the 
states and which to the federal government. The logical starting point for this 
discussion is the Tenth Amendment,3 which tells us that all things not 
2 See Heather Long, Trump is a ‘Crony Capitalist,’ Says GOP Senator Flake, WASH. POST (Aug. 
2, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2017/08/02/trump-is-a-crony-capitalist-says-
gop-senator-flake/?utm_term=.3ebedbc7d358; Nomi Prins, The Magnitude of Trump’s Cronyism is Off 
the Charts—Even for Washington, NATION (Dec. 9, 2016), https://www.thenation.com/article/the-
magnitude-of-trumps-cronyism-is-off-the-charts-even-for-washington/; Noah Smith, Trump Wants 
Consumers to Pay for Keeping Coal Alive, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 11, 2017), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-10-11/trump-wants-consumers-to-pay-for-keeping-coal-
alive. 
3 U.S. CONST. amend. X (?The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor 
prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people.?). 
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specifically enumerated by the Constitution as belonging in federal hands 
should be in the realm of state law. Much debate has centered on which 
branch of government gets the honor of interpreting the Constitution to assess 
which things belong in the federal realm.4
The statement that everything not designated as federal should be left to 
the states is not as helpful as it may first appear. The truth is that the U.S. 
Constitution is not as clear of a document as we suggest it to be. Lack of 
clarity from the Constitution is likely because the problems of today were not 
contemplated, and the need for precise language was unrealized.5
The lack of constitutional clarity is easy to see in the realm of 
environmental law. Many environmental laws find their constitutional 
footing in the Commerce Clause (although the Treaty Power and Property 
Clause have significant roles to play as well).6 Yet, the Commerce Clause is 
confusing, and courts have struggled for years to determine its boundaries.7
This leaves a muddy debate over the division between state and federal 
powers in environmental law. 
The patterns of environmental pollution and land degradation in our 
nation demonstrate why federal policies governing natural resources are 
often necessary.8 For natural resources and land conservation, the concept of 
environmental federalism is less clear. It is not the environmental federalism 
that we think about, with the federal government setting the standards and 
then the states running the program. The relationship is different for a few 
reasons. 
First, while the federal government is the owner of many of the nation?s
natural resources, resource extraction can feel like a particularly local event. 
While climate change has global implications, there is no debate that an 
4 See, e.g., Erin Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1 (2011). 
5 Robert H. Bork & Daniel E. Troy, Locating the Boundaries: The Scope of Congress’s Power to 
Regulate Commerce, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL?Y 849, 851?56 (2002) (discussing early understandings 
of commerce). 
6 Christine A. Klein, The Environmental Commerce Clause, 27 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (2003). 
7 See Bork & Troy, supra note 5, at 850?51. Some of the trickiest Commerce Clause cases have 
involved the Clean Water Act. Robert W. Adler, US Environmental Protection Agency’s New Waters of 
the United States Rule: Connecting Law and Science, 34 FRESHWATER SCI. 1595, 1595?97 (2015) 
(describing Commerce Clause debates in the context of jurisdiction of the Clean Water Act); Mark 
Squillace, The Judicial Assault on the Clean Water Act, 59 FED. L. 33, 35?39 (2012) (describing the 
Supreme Court?s Clean Water Act jurisdictional jurisprudence). While the Supreme Court readily 
acknowledges a federal interest in keeping navigable waters and channels of commerce free from 
pollution, the Court struggles over how far its interests in waters can stretch. This is a conversation 
complicated by changing understandings of hydrology and chemistry. 
8 See Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 MICH. L. REV. 570, 590 (1996) 
(explaining why federal environmental laws are needed); William W. Buzbee, Contextual Environmental 
Federalism, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 108, 118 (2005) (explaining how the overlapping federal and state 
jurisdiction can improve environmental protection). 
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action like forest-clearing still has local benefits and drawbacks. The jobs are 
local. The soil erosion is likely local. The water quality aspects are local or 
regional. Yet, the biodiversity implications could be global. The climate 
change impacts are clearly global. Thus, one natural resource extraction 
decision could affect people and governments at all different levels. 
With widespread federal landownership, the issues about responsibility 
and decision-making power is not hung up on constitutional debates. The 
Property Clause of the Constitution solidifies the federal government?s
ability to make all needful rules covering its lands,9 and federal courts have 
consistently interpreted this rule expansively, acknowledging widespread 
federal powers that can at times extend beyond the boundaries of the public 
lands.10 The status of the federal government as a landowner makes the idea 
that the federal government has the power to make the rules governing natural 
resources and environmental conditions on its land logical. I do not suggest 
the question whether the land should be in federal hands lacks controversy, 
but once we accept the federal government as landowner, the idea that this 
landowner gets not only the right to manage its own lands but a superior right 
to set rules that conflict with state law does not seem like that much of a 
stretch. 
Second, we have a unique legal history with natural resources. Under 
Roman law, many natural resources were said to be owned by the people.11
This included water,12 air,13 wildlife,14 and coastal lands.15 While title to the 
resources resided in the people, the government acted as a trustee, protecting 
and managing these resources on behalf of the citizens.16 This concept was 
translated to British law, with the ownership largely going to the crown but 
imposing on the king an obligation to safeguard the resources on behalf of 
present and future generations.17 The English kings differed in their 
interpretation of this duty. As the land and resources of the King of England 
9 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. 
10 See, e.g., Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529 (1976); Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518 
(1897); Minnesota v. Block, 660 F.2d 1240 (8th Cir. 1981). 
11 See Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial 
Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 473, 475?78 (1970) (discussing the historical foundations of the Public 
Trust Doctrine). 
12 Id. at 475. 
13 THE INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN 2.1.1 at p. 55 (translated Peter Birks and Grant McLeod 1987) 
(?The things which are naturally everybody?s are: air, flowing water, the sea, and sea-shore.?). 
14 Richard J. Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of Property and Sovereignty in Natural Resources: 
Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 71 IOWA L. REV. 631, 640 (1985). 
15 Ralph W. Johnson et al., The Public Trust Doctrine and Coastal Zone Management in 
Washington State, 67 WASH. L. REV. 521, 524 (1992). 
16 See Sax, supra note 11. 
17 Charles F Wilkinson, The Headwaters of the Public Trust: Some Thoughts on the Source and 
Scope of the Traditional Doctrine, 19 ENVTL. L. 425, 429?31 (1989). 
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in the New World passed to people of the United States after the American 
Revolution, it was not clear whether the federal government or the state 
government would serve the role of trustee.18 Worry about an overly 
consolidated federal power, alongside a feeling that the states were closer to 
the people, meant that the law was generally interpreted as making the state 
the controller of natural resources. 
This leaves us with a muddle. We say it makes the most sense for the 
states to manage natural resources, but then the federal government is 
actually the owner of a lot of them, and then we have the pesky problem of 
natural resources that cross or span state borders making the impacts of 
natural resource extraction felt at different levels. What is a good federalist 
to do? 
The justifications for federal ownership are many, but here we focus on 
the idea that the federal government must manage and care for these public 
trust resources on behalf of all Americans. That is, with public lands and 
resources, the federal government takes an expansive view of who the public 
is?going beyond the citizens that directly come in contact with the 
resources. This broader or longer view combined with a progressive era idea 
of government officials with expertise in resource management would bring 
about the greatest good, for the greatest number, for the longest time.19
Where the federal government is the landowner, it makes sense that the 
federal government is the decision maker, as with private landowners.20 But 
such a pattern has not always sat well in regions where the federal 
government is a large or majority landowner.21 In such areas, the states and 
the citizens of those states may feel that the deck is skewed too heavily in 
favor of the federal government. This complaint has been particularly 
18 Id. at 453?60. 
19 U.S. FOREST SERV., PINCHOT AND UTILITARIANISM,
https://www.fs.fed.us/greatestgood/press/mediakit/facts/pinchot.shtml (last visited Dec. 23, 2017) 
(discussing the letter outlining Gifford Pinchot?s theory of management of federal forests as seeking to 
serve the greatest good for the longest time and the movie that the U.S. Forest Service made to honor the 
agency?s centennial). 
20 Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518, 524 (1897) (explaining that the United States has the 
same power over its land as an ordinary proprietor). 
21 See, e.g., Bruce Babbitt, Federalism and the Environment: An Intergovernmental Perspective 
of the Sagebrush Rebellion, 12 ENVTL. L. 847 (1982) (describing the sagebrush rebellion, a movement 
against federal landownership and decision-making); Elizabeth M. Osenbaugh & Nancy K. Stoner, The 
County Supremacy Movement, 28 URB. LAW. 497 (1996) (describing the County Supremacy Movement 
and state opposition to federal land ownership); Kirk Siegler, High Stakes As Rancher Cliven Bundy’s
Trial Over Armed Standoff Begins, NPR (Oct. 30, 2017), 
https://www.npr.org/2017/10/30/560849871/high-stakes-as-rancher-cliven-bundys-trial-over-armed-
standoff-begins (describing the colorful story of the Bundy family that has led armed protests against 
federal control and regulation of land in the Western United States). 
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emotional when it comes to access to natural resources, including oil and gas, 
minerals, grazing lands, recreation, and hunting.22
With clear legal justification for federal regulation of most natural 
resources, the conversation changes to focus on some combination of 
efficiency and ethics. Which level of government should be responsible for 
resource management decisions?23 For many states, the issue is neither 
constitutional language nor economic efficiency, but a more essential debate 
over the nature of sovereignty and the power of the state to make decisions 
about the natural resources within its boundaries. The conversation, couched 
in terms of sovereignty, is undoubtedly economic. For some, the question 
may be more properly phrased as which entity has the best claim on economic 
returns from natural resource development? 
Patterns of resistance to federal power can come from individuals who 
want control over resources, like the Cliven Bundys of the world who assert 
a right to use land owned by the federal government without needing to obtain 
permission, follow grazing rules, or pay rent.24 We also see more coordinated 
resistance from state and local governments.25 While the federal courts have 
never decided in their favor,26 states routinely pass laws asserting their 
ownership rights over natural resources and their right to control federal 
lands.27 Although the federal government has made minimal moves to convey 
lands to states or put them in full control of the resources within their 
boundaries, the federal agencies sometimes seek state buy-in by including 
state representatives in management decisions and, importantly, by 
conveying significant funds to states via PILTs (payments in lieu of taxes) 
and royalty payments.28 And sometimes, the federal government goes the 
exact opposite direction and ignores state desires. We saw this with President 
22 With some people willing to die for their beliefs or willing to kill for them. See, e.g., Robert 
Anglen, Mohave County Renames Road After LaVoy Finicum, Militia Member Killed by Officers,
AZCENTRAL (Nov. 10, 2017, 9:44 PM), https://www.azcentral.com/story/news/local/arizona-
investigations/2017/11/10/mohave-county-renames-road-after-lavoy-finicum-militia-member-killed-
officers/853161001/. We can even date this back to early forest grazing cases. See, e.g., United States v. 
Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506 (1911) (challenging the Forest Service?s ability to regulate grazing on federal 
lands); see also Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523 (1911); United States v. Rizzinelli, 182 F. 675 (D. 
Idaho 1910) (upholding the Forest Service?s ability to regulate activity on its land where private 
individuals had mining permits). 
23 See David A. Dana, One Green America: Continuities and Discontinuities in Environmental 
Federalism in the United States, 24 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 103, 103, 107 (2017) (asking those 
questions generally about environmental law). 
24 Siegler, supra note 21. 
25 See id.
26 United States v. Gardner, 107 F.3d 1314 (9th Cir. 1997). 
27 Ryan McMaken, Can the States Seize Control of Federal Lands?, MISES INSTITUTE (Aug. 21, 
2015), https://mises.org/library/can-states-seize-control-federal-lands. 
28 Don Seastone, Revenue Sharing or Payments in Lieu of Taxes on Federal Lands?, 47 LAND
ECON. 373 (1971). 
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Clinton?s designation of Grand Staircase Escalante as a National Monument, 
where not only was there minimal consultation with officials in Utah but the 
announcement was made in Arizona.29
Is local better? Economists Henry Butler and Jonathan Macey think so. 
That was the heart of their idea of the Matching Principle, which suggests 
that decision-making (including resource management decisions) should 
happen at the level of government where the costs and benefits are most 
directly felt.30 Embodied in their writings is an idea that local is best. Yet, it 
is hard to determine the costs and benefits (both the amount and who is 
actually experiencing them) in the context of natural resource management. 
Often there is a disconnect between costs and benefits. For example, tax 
dollars from many people support land conservation that most directly 
benefits those that can see the land or that actually reside on it. The cost is 
distributed and the benefits concentrated. Alternatively, prohibiting a 
landowner from converting a wetland to arable farmland, imposes direct pain 
on her with a benefit felt by large swaths of society who gain water filtration, 
endangered species protection, and other benefits. These complicated 
environmental scenarios mean that a simple cost-benefit analysis rarely 
provides a satisfying outcome. 
Determining which level of government is the correct manager of 
natural resources does not resolve the issue of what the obligations and 
responsibilities of such management should be. Depending on the level of 
government, we shift who we regard as the beneficiaries. When the federal 
government is the trustee, it should be thinking about land management 
decisions in terms that will yield the greatest benefit for all Americans 
(hopefully considering both present and future generations). As the level of 
land management becomes more local, the definition of the beneficiaries 
narrows to just state residents or, possibly even more devolved, to people in 
a county or municipality. 
The Trump Administration appears to be taking a narrower view of its 
trustee responsibility than previous administrations. While theoretically the 
Administration should be acting on behalf of all the current and present 
generations of Americans, the Department of Interior?s actions on natural 
resource management seem to benefit a smaller subset of the public. Indeed, 
29 Paul Larmer, 1996: Clinton Takes a 1.7 Million-Acre Stand in Utah, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS
(Sept. 30, 1996), https://www.hcn.org/issues/90/2795 (describing the anger of Utah officials at the naming 
of the National Monument). President Trump sharply reduced the size of the monument, a move that does 
not move the land into private hands but does increase the ability to engage in extractive uses on the land. 
Julie Turkewitz, Trump Slashes Size of Bears Ears and Grand Staircase Monuments, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 
4, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/04/us/trump-bears-ears.html. 
30 Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, Externalities and the Matching Principle: The Case for 
Reallocating Environmental Regulatory Authority, 14 YALE L. & POL?Y REV. 23 (1996). 
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as the following section will detail, policy changes seem to be targeted at 
benefitting specific industries or presidential allies. 
The following section focuses on one category of natural resource policy 
in the Trump Administration as a glimpse into the President?s view of natural 
resources federalism. While Trump echoes the federal trust ideas and 
trumpets states? rights, his decisions appear to be mostly maneuvers to bolster 
his supporters and donors without regard to general public benefit. I examine 
changes in policy regarding coal extraction on public lands. To tell this story 
fully, I explain the coal-leasing program in detail, the Obama 
Administration?s restraints on the program, and the changes coming from the 
Trump Administration. Along the way, I offer a few other examples that 
relate to the coal industry and federal environmental and natural resource 
policy. If the connection between federalism and the current coal policies 
seems hazy, you are on the right track. The rhetoric of the Administration has 
been one of supporting state decision-making over the interference of 
government bureaucrats, but his federalism banner appears to be little more 
than a smoke screen to justify cronyism. This essay thus offers a brief glimpse 
into the workings of the Administration and helps us try to align justifications 
and motivations.31
II. NATURAL RESOURCES AND THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION:
THE CASE OF COAL
A. Coal-Leasing on Federal Lands 
There are, of course, many different natural resources, and while their 
management differs, their protection involves similar sentiments because of 
the scarce nature of the resources and their high societal values. Management 
can be particularly tricky for resources that are easily depletable or, as with 
fossil fuels, essentially nonrenewable. In the context of this essay, I examine 
coal extracted from public land with brief references to other fossil fuels. 
Through examination of the policy changes, decision-making approaches, 
and outcomes for coal, we can trace a pattern of approach from the current 
31 This coal-leasing example is a small part of a larger research project into the changes in natural 
resources law occurring under the Trump Administration. Two interesting patterns are emerging. One has 
to do with how the Administration views natural resources statutes (primarily the Federal Land Policy and 
Management Act or FLPMA) and who it views as the public beneficiaries of government policy. The 
second pattern is the federalism story. The Trump Administration and its supporters seem to be mirroring 
policies of the 1950s and 60s when states? rights and federalism served as the justification for racist 
policies. Once again, states? rights are the rallying cry but does not really seem to be the heart of what 
people making that cry care about. This essay introduces these patterns, but focuses on the second in 
keeping with the theme of the symposium. 
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Administration and perhaps begin to understand the direction of management 
of all public natural resources in the Trump Administration. 
Promotion of the coal industry was an important part of Donald Trump?s
campaign and has been a cornerstone of his energy policy.32 Coal has long 
been a central component of the U.S. energy supply and has composed 
significant portions of the nation?s electricity grid.33 Around 90% of U.S. coal 
goes to the electricity market.34 Yet, coal?s role in U.S. electricity 
composition is falling. In 1990, coal made up 60% of the electricity 
generation in the United States.35 By 2016, that percentage had fallen to 32%, 
taking an 18% hit from 2015 to 2016.36 The reasons for its decline are 
manifold: (1) a decrease in the overall demand for electricity in the early 
2000s due to the recession coupled with improved energy efficiency;37 (2) a 
decrease in the cost of natural gas based on the rise of hydraulic fracturing 
technology;38 (3) increasing competitiveness of renewable energy sources;39
and (4) environmental policies and permitting processes.40 Thus, Trump faces 
the conundrum of trying to uphold a campaign promise to reinvigorate the 
coal industry that is facing challenges largely beyond his control. It is 
unsurprising, therefore, that Trump has chosen to focus on reducing costs 
from environmental policies and looking for other ways to streamline 
32 Darryl Fears, Trump Promised to Bring Back Coal Jobs. That Promise ‘Will Not Be Kept,’
Experts Say, WASH. POST (Mar. 29, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-
environment/wp/2017/03/29/trump-promised-to-bring-back-coal-jobs-that-promise-will-not-be-kept-
experts-say/?utm_term=.5d0c9e913f58. 
33 U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ELECTRICITY IN THE U.S., 
https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/index.cfm?page=electricity_in_the_united_states (last visited Dec. 
23, 2017). 
34 U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL COAL REPORT 2016 (2017), 
https://www.eia.gov/coal/annual/ [hereinafter 2016 ANNUAL COAL REPORT] (?The electric power sector 
accounted for about 92.8% of the total U.S. coal consumption in 2016.?). 
35 Christine Klein et al., Wildlife and the Endangered Species Act, in NATURAL RESOURCES LAW,
507 (2018). 
36 2016 ANNUAL COAL REPORT, supra note 34. 
37 U.S. Electricity Sales Have Decreased in Four of the Past Five Years, U.S. ENERGY INFO.
ADMIN. (Dec. 20, 2013), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=14291 (explaining that 
increased energy efficiency is one of the reasons for a decrease in electricity usage and that during the 
2009 recession, electricity usage was lower). 
38 Charles D. Kolstad, What Is Killing the US Coal Industry?, STANFORD INST. FOR ECON. POL?Y
RES. (Mar. 2017), https://siepr.stanford.edu/research/publications/what-killing-us-coal-industry. 
39 See Diane Cardwell & Clifford Krauss, Coal Country’s Power Plants Are Turning Away from 
Coal, N.Y. TIMES (May 26, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/26/business/energy-
environment/coal-power-renewable-energy.html (discussing industry shifts towards renewable energy 
technologies). 
40 Klein et al., supra note 35, at 508; see also, Jeff Keffer, Excessive EPA Regulations Harming 
Coal Industry, PARKERSBURG NEWS & SENTINEL (Jan. 18, 2017), 
http://www.newsandsentinel.com/opinion/local-columns/2017/01/excessive-epa-regulations-harming-
coal-industry/ (a coal industry executive expressing his frustration with environmental regulation). 
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extraction processes, areas within his control. The Executive Branch can play 
a significant role in the vibrancy of the coal industry?not only because it 
enforces many of the environmental regulations at play, but also because it 
manages significant amounts of the country?s coal reserves on behalf of the 
American people. 
When contemplating coal-leasing, two significant bodies of law come 
into play. First, the coal-leasing laws themselves determine who gets to 
extract coal from federal lands and the financial arrangements associated with 
the transactions. These laws operate in conjunction with the general 
governing rules for the Department of the Interior. Second, federal 
environmental laws set rules for reducing environmental impacts and 
conducting environmental review. This section briefly outlines the main 
federal laws governing the extraction of coal on federal lands. It then explains 
the Obama-era policies and contrasts them with those of the Trump 
Administration. 
The federal government owns 640 million acres of land, mostly in the 
West.41 In the United States, about half of the coal produced (overall, not just 
federal lands) is from underground mining that occurs in the eastern half of 
the country (Appalachia).42 This bituminous coal has a high sulfur content.43
The other half of the produced coal comes from surface mines in the West on 
largely federal lands.44 This sub-bituminous coal has a lower sulfur content.45
The 1990 Amendments to the Clean Air Act meant that many companies 
switched to the sub-bituminous coal,46 putting higher emphasis on the 
western lands, which were also more likely to be owned by the federal 
government.47 The federal coal-leasing program currently supplies about 
41 See CAROL HARDY VINCENT ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42346, FEDERAL LAND
OWNERSHIP: OVERVIEW AND DATA (2017), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42346.pdf (explaining that the 
federal government owns ?roughly 640 million acres?); Quoctrung Bui & Margot Sanger-Katz, Why the 
Government Owns So Much Land, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 5, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/06/upshot/why-the-government-owns-so-much-land-in-the-west.html 
(describing concentrations of public lands in the West and why that occurred). 
42 LINCOLN DAVIES ET AL., ENERGY LAW AND POLICY 107?115 (2015). 
43 James C. Hower et al., Changes in the Quality of Coal Combustion By-Products Produced by 
Kentucky Power Plants, 1978 to 1997: Consequences of Clean Air Act Directives, 78 FUEL 701, 711 
(1999). 
44 See Nathan Joo et al., Fact Sheet: 5 Things You Should Know About Powder River Basin Coal 
Exports, CENTER FOR AM. PROGRESS (Aug. 19, 2014, 9:06 AM), 
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/green/reports/2014/08/19/95820/fact-sheet-5-things-you-
should-know-about-powder-river-basin-coal-exports/. 
45 DAVIES ET AL., supra note 42. 
46 Byron Swift, How Environmental Laws Work: An Analysis of the Utility Sector’s Response to 
Regulation of Nitrogen Oxides and Sulfur Dioxide Under the Clean Air Act, 14 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 309, 324 
(2001). 
47 VINCENT ET AL., supra note 41 (showing concentration of federal land in the western half of the 
country). 
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40% of the nation?s coal.48 Over 570 million acres of federal land is 
potentially available for coal leasing with the federal government holding 
either full fee simple title or only the mineral rights.49 Most (85%) federal 
coal is from the Powder River Basin in Montana and Wyoming.50 In 2014, 
there were 310 federal coal leases.51 In 2015, 383 million tons of coal were 
produced with federal leases.52
The Bureau of Land Management (BLM), within the Department of the 
Interior, manages the coal-leasing program regardless of which entity 
manages the surface estate although the most likely federal surface manager 
is in fact the BLM.53 Land under the federal coal-leasing program may also 
be managed by other federal agencies or owned by other entities (state and 
local governments as well as private parties).54
The first law governing coal extraction on federal lands was the 1872 
General Mining Act.55 Congress wrote this law in the context of California 
gold mining, and by the early 1900s, the federal government realized that it 
48 RYAN ZINKE, U.S. DEP?T OF THE INTERIOR, SECRETARIAL ORDER NO. 3348, CONCERNING THE 
FEDERAL COAL MORATORIUM 1 (2017) [hereinafter ZINKE ORDER]. Acting Secretary Bail?s memo of 
February 9, 2017, put that number at 42%. KRISTEN BAIL, BUREAU OF LAND MGMT, U.S. DEP?T OF THE 
INTERIOR, INFORMATION/BRIEFING MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY ? LAND AND 
MINERALS MANAGEMENT: INPUT TO LEADERSHIP ON FIVE PROMISING AREAS FOR COAL LEASING AND 
DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION TRENDS, LEASING INFORMATION AND REGULATION/ADMINISTRATIVE 
CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES 2 (2017) [hereinafter BAIL MEMO]. 
49 See SALLY JEWELL, U.S. DEP?T OF THE INTERIOR, SECRETARIAL ORDER NO. 3338,
DISCRETIONARY PROGRAMMATIC ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT TO MODERNIZE THE FEDERAL 
COAL PROGRAM 1 (2016) [hereinafter JEWELL ORDER]. 
50 New Powder River Basin-Wide Coal Assessment of Recoverable Resources and Reserves,
USGS (Feb. 26, 2013), 
https://energy.usgs.gov/GeneralInfo/EnergyNewsroomAll/TabId/770/ArtMID/3941/ArticleID/961/New-
Powder-River-Basin-Wide-Coal-Assessment-of-Recoverable-Resources-and-Reserves.aspx. 
51 JEWELL ORDER, supra note 49, at 2. 
52 BAIL MEMO, supra note 48, at 2. 
53 The BLM oversees the leasing process while other entities govern other parts of the process. 
See Coal, BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., U.S. DEP?T OF THE INTERIOR,
https://www.blm.gov/programs/energy-and-minerals/coal (last visited Feb. 20, 2018). States and the 
Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement (OSMRE) have regulatory responsibilities over 
the operations while the Office of Natural Resources Revenue (ONRR) collects, disburses and verifies 
revenues from leases and keeps. See Who We Are, OFF. OF SURFACE MINING RECLAMATION AND 
ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEP?T OF INTERIOR, https://www.osmre.gov/about.shtm (last updated Aug. 10, 
2017); Payments, OFF. OF NAT. RESOURCES REVENUE, U.S. DEP?T OF INTERIOR,
https://www.onrr.gov/reportpay/payments.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2018). 
54 Coal Data, BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., U.S. DEP?T OF THE INTERIOR,
https://www.blm.gov/programs/energy-and-minerals/coal/coal-data (last visited Feb. 22, 2018). For the 
purposes of this essay, we set aside discussion of Indian lands as they are governed by other laws and are 
associated with a federal trust obligation that does not arise in the context of other lands. 
55 See General Mining Act of 1872, ch. 152, 17 Stat. 91 (1872) (codified in scattered sections of 
30 U.S.C.). 
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was not a good fit for all mineral extraction.56 Legislators agreed that they 
should regulate fossil fuels and other substances (like fertilizers) 
differently.57 This led to the 1920 Mineral Leasing Act.58 The 1920 Act 
instituted a competitive leasing process and, unlike the 1872 Act, contained 
no provision for transferring lands out of federal ownership.59 There were 
two parts to the program. Alongside the competitive leasing process for 
known areas of coal resources was a ?preference right leasing process? that 
encouraged private parties to explore and develop coal reserves not yet 
known.60
The coal-leasing program proceeded under this approach until the 1960s 
when there were concerns about speculation in the coal-leasing market.61 By 
the 1970s, however, government officials became wary of the development 
of the program.62 They worried that prospectors were obtaining permits 
without diligently pursuing exploration.63 Thus, the essential concern was 
underexploitation (with associated lower revenue generation). This led to the 
Federal Coal Leasing Amendments Act of 1976.64 With this statute, the 
federal government abandoned the preference rights for not-yet-known 
sources and created an exclusive competitive leasing process.65 Alongside the 
statute, the Department of the Interior promulgated regulations.66 The 
regulations set minimum royalty rates of 12.5% for surface mines and 8% for 
underground mines.67 The regulations also indicated that where mining was 
to occur on lands managed by the U.S. Forest Service or another land 
56 David Gerard, The Development of First-Possession Rules in US Mining, 1872–1920: Theory, 
Evidence, and Policy Implications, 24 RESOURCES POL?Y 251, 255 (1998). 
57 See Robert C. Anderson, Federal Mineral Policy: The General Mining Law of 1872, 16 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 601, 613 (1976). 
58 See 30 U.S.C. § 181 (2018). 
59 As with other natural resources laws of the time, the General Mining Act was a land dispersion 
act, which sought to facilitate exploitation of federal natural resources and also conveyance of federal 
lands into private hands. Because miners could work the land without the burden of landownership, many 
chose not to exercise the ability to patent the land and gain full fee simple title. KLEIN ET AL., supra note 
35. 
60 Id. at 509. 
61 JEWELL ORDER, supra note 49, at 5. 
62 KLEIN ET AL., supra note 35, at 509. 
63 See Mark Squillace, The Tragic Story of the Federal Coal Leasing Program, 27 NAT.
RESOURCES & ENV?T 29, 30 (2013). 
64 Federal Coal Leasing Amendments Act, H.R. 6721, 94th Cong. (1976); see Sam Kalen, Where 
Do We Go From Here?: The Federal Coal Leasing Amendments Act—Past, Present, and Future, 98 W.
VA. L. REV. 1023, 1024?25 (1995). 
65 See Cedric Hustace, The New Federal Coal Leasing System, 10 NAT. RESOURCES LAW 323, 
359 (1977). 
66 See 43 C.F.R. §§ 3420?3470 (2018). 
67 43 C.F.R. § 3473.3?2 (2018). 
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management entity, that agency?s consultation and approval is required.68
Consultation with states and Indian tribes is also required before land can be 
opened to leasing.69
Also, in 1976, Congress passed the Federal Land Policy and 
Management Act (FLPMA).70 This statute serves as the organic act for the 
BLM, outlining its duties and giving details about its methods of operation.71
BLM studies in the 1970s showed that the number of acres under production 
increased while the levels of coal production actually fell.72 The BLM 
responded by placing a moratorium on coal-leasing while engaging in an 
environmental review under the 1969 National Environmental Policy Act 
(NEPA).73 The process resulted in a programmatic environmental impact 
statement, a comprehensive environmental review for the program as a 
whole, followed by NEPA litigation, and eventually new leasing regulations 
(that were again subject to litigation).74 These leasing regulations?the 1979 
coal-leasing regulations with amendments in 1982?are the ones that still 
govern operations today. The moratorium implemented during the 
environmental review process was gradually scaled back and fully lifted in 
1981.75
In 1981, concerns regarding the calculation of fair market value in the 
Powder River Basin reared their ugly heads.76 This led to the establishment 
of the Linowes Commission in 1983 to investigate pricing.77 The 
Commission imposed another moratorium on leasing while conducting an 
environmental study.78 That moratorium was lifted in 1987.79 Unfortunately, 
these reviews did not seem to alleviate the underlying pricing and 
competition concerns. 
68 43 C.F.R. §§ 3420.1?6, 3420.4?2 (2018). 
69 See 43 C.F.R. §§ 3420.1?7, 3420.4-3, 3420.4-4 (2018). 
70 Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94?579, 90 Stat. 2743. 
71 Frank Gregg, Symposium on the Federal Land Policy and Management Act: Introduction, 21 
ARIZ. L. REV. 271, 271 (1979). 
72 JEWELL ORDER, supra note 49, at 5; see ROBERT H. NELSON, THE MAKING OF FEDERAL COAL 
POLICY 25 (1983); Squillace, supra note 63, at 30. 
73 See John Latz, The Federal Coal Leasing Program, PUB. LANDS MIN. LEASING: ISSUES AND 
DIRECTIONS 1 (1985). 
74 See BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., U.S. DEP?T OF THE INTERIOR, FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT 
STATEMENT SUPPLEMENT FOR THE FEDERAL COAL MANAGEMENT PROGRAM 4 (1985) (explaining that 
NEPA process from 1979-1985). 
75 JEWELL ORDER, supra note 49 at 5, 6. 
76 Id. at 6; Squillace, supra note 63, at 30. 
77 Sandra L. Blackstone, Getting the Coal Leasing Program Back on Track: The Linowes 
Commission and Beyond, in PUB. LANDS MIN. LEASING: ISSUES AND DIRECTIONS 1, 5 (1985). 
78 JEWELL ORDER, supra note 49, at § 2(c). 
79 Id.
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The 1979 regulations establish two avenues for leasing. One is where 
the BLM reviews an area of land and designates zones as open for bidding 
(regional leasing).80 The other is where the members of the public (i.e. 
energy/extraction companies) file applications to open an area to extraction 
(leasing by application).81 The regional system was only briefly used in the 
1980s, and since then, all coal-leasing has occurred by application.82 This is 
true despite the fact that regional leasing is supposed to be the default process 
and leasing by application only to occur in unusual circumstances.83
If you seek to mine coal on federal land today, you must proceed through 
a somewhat lengthy but relatively straightforward process. The first step is 
to identify an area you want to mine and ask the BLM to open it up for 
competitive bidding.84 The BLM assesses the land and determines whether it 
should be opened for coal-leasing. The BLM reviews the application to make 
sure it is complete, conforms to existing land-use plans, and contains enough 
information to determine the fair market value of the coal.85 It then begins 
the environmental review process86 and consults with landowners, states, 
tribes, and other stakeholders.87 It also checks to see whether the surface 
owner will consent.88 Note, because the mineral estate is considered the 
dominant estate, holders of the mineral estate have a right to extract the 
subsurface minerals even where such extraction may impact the owners of 
the surface estate.89
After or in conjunction with public commenting, the BLM estimates the 
fair market value of the coal.90 It keeps that information confidential while 
opening the area for bidding (thus, the initial application is just to allow 
bidding on a certain parcel, but the entity filing the application will not 
necessarily end up with the lease). Bids are accepted, and the winning bid is 
80 43 C.F.R. § 3420 (2014). 
81 Id. at § 3425. 
82 JEWELL ORDER, supra note 49, at § 2(a). 
83 Squillace, supra note 63, at 3. 
84 There is also a process for opening up new areas under non-competitive bidding, through a lease 
by modification process. Under the lease by modification process, an existing leaseholder can request to 
have a tract added but must demonstrate that it would not be of competitive interest. That is, but for the 
applicant, the mineral resources would not be exploited. BAIL MEMO, supra note 48, at 2. 
85 JEWELL ORDER, supra note 49, at § 2(a). 
86 The question of when to conduct NEPA review in the context of coal mining has been a fraught 
topic since the 1970s. KLEIN ET AL., supra note 35, at 120?132. 
87 JEWELL ORDER, supra note 49, at § 2(a). This stage could also involve actions under Section 7 
of the Endangered Species Act or review under Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act. See
16 U.S.C.A. § 1536 (West 2004); 54 U.S.C.A. § 306108 (West 2014). 
88 JEWELL ORDER, supra note 49, at § 2(a).
89 Kendor P. Jones et al., Split Estates and Surface Access Issues, in LANDMAN?S LEGAL 
HANDBOOK 193?95 (5th ed. 2013). 
90 43 C.F.R. § 3422.1(b) (2014). 
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the highest one received but cannot be lower than the fair market value.91
This means that there could be a failed bidding process if none of the bids 
received matches the fair market value estimated by the BLM. Bidders must 
meet eligibility requirements and pay certain fees.92 Bids contain a proposal 
for royalty payments, rental payments, and an initial payment.93 By 
regulation, the royalty payments cannot be under 12.5% for surface mines or 
under 8% for underground mines.94 In theory, bidders could offer more in an 
attempt to be the winning bid, but this rarely happens. This is likely because 
in over 90% of the leases, there is only one bidder?the person who initiated 
the process to begin with.95
Once a company has won the bid, it has to get a permit under the Surface 
Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 (SMCRA), and it has to obtain 
approval of a federal mine plan from the Assistant Secretary for Land and 
Minerals.96 The BLM receives money in three ways: (1) bonus paid at the 
time of lease issuance, (2) rental fees, and (3) production royalties.97 All three 
sources of money are split evenly with the state.98 This gives states a financial 
incentive to not only increase mining overall but also to increase royalty and 
rent levels. This may be particularly so where the subsurface and surface are 
both held by the federal government because there is no competing interest 
coming from the surface owner. This reveals the state motivation for 
encouraging coal-leasing.99 The activity occurs on federal land, but the state 
gets half the money.100
91 Id. at § 3422.1(c)(1); JEWELL ORDER, supra note 49, at § 2(a). 
92 43 C.F.R. § 3472.1?1 (2014). 
93 JEWELL ORDER, supra note 49, at § 2(a). 
94 43 C.F.R. §§ 3473.3?2(a)(1)?(2) (2014). 
95 JEWELL ORDER, supra note 49, at § 2(b)(i). 
96 The major environmental laws at play are the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and 
the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 (SMCRA). 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321?4375 (2016); 30 
U.S.C. §§ 1201?1328 (2016). NEPA requires environmental review for federal actions that may 
significantly affect the environment. SMCRA requires a permit for any coal-mining operations regardless 
of whether on public or private land. The issuance of a SMCRA permit triggers NEPA so a NEPA process 
is required for all coal operations in the United States. 
97 JEWELL ORDER, supra note 49, at § 2(a). 
98 Squillace, supra note 63, at 3. 
99 However, even under this scenario, a state should be motivated to improve the competitive 
nature of the bids or set minimum bidding levels as current bids appear to be well below market. Id. at 4?
5. 
100 See, e.g., Bill Chappell, U.S. Announces Moratorium on New Coal Leases on Federal Lands,
NPR (Jan. 15, 2016, 9:40 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/01/15/463164790/u-s-
moratorium-on-new-coal-leases-to-be-announced-friday (stating that in 2014, Wyoming received over 
$555 million from federal coal leases). 
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B. Coal-Leasing Policy Under the Obama Administration 
After years of concerns with the federal coal-leasing program from 
multiple fronts, the Secretary of the Interior in the Obama Administration, 
Sally Jewell, called for an ?open conversation about modernizing the [ ] coal 
program.?101 Also inspiring action were reports completed by the Office of 
the Investigator General (OIG) and the Government Accountability Office 
(GAO).102 These reports (the ?OIG/GAO Reports?) expressed concern with 
whether taxpayers were actually receiving fair market value from the sale of 
coal.103 The reports noted problems with a lack of transparency,104 and their 
findings on absence of competition suggested an oversupply of coal.105
The Department of the Interior began a series of listening sessions in 
2015.106 The five listening sessions involved hundreds of attendees and 289 
speakers.107 Over 92,000 comments were submitted.108 The comments 
identified six themes of concern: (1) global climate change,109 (2) loss of jobs 
and revenue, (3) need for increased transparency and public participation plus 
concerns over inadequate compensation, (4) the royalty rate (both the idea 
that it needs to account for environmental costs and that it should match 
offshore extraction), (5) need to keep rates low (and even make them lower), 
and (6) streamlining of the leasing process.110
101 BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., U.S. DEP?T OF THE INTERIOR, 1 FEDERAL COAL PROGRAM 
PROGRAMMATIC ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT?SCOPING REPORT ES-3 (Jan. 2017) 
[hereinafter PEIS SCOPING REPORT]. 
102 U.S. GOV?T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-14-140, COAL LEASING: BLM COULD ENHANCE 
APPRAISAL PROCESS, MORE EXPLICITLY CONSIDER COAL EXPORTS, AND PROVIDE MORE PUBLIC 
INFORMATION (2013) [hereinafter GAO REPORT]; OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP?T OF 
INTERIOR: REPORT NO. CR-EV-BLM-0001-2012, FINAL EVALUATION REPORT ? COAL MANAGEMENT 
PROGRAM (2013) [hereinafter OIG REPORT]. 
103 GAO REPORT, supra note 102, at 15?17; OIG REPORT, supra note 102, at 1. 
104 GAO REPORT, supra note 102, at 47. 
105 Benjamin Storrow, Moratorium Announced on New Coal Leases, CASPER STAR TRIB. (Jan. 
15, 2016), http://trib.com/business/energy/moratorium-announced-on-new-coal-leases/article_5342a826-
cacd-5120-9e6a-23cfee3c865f.html. 
106 PEIS SCOPING REPORT, supra note 101, at 2-2. 
107 JEWELL ORDER, supra note 49, at § 2(b). 
108 PEIS SCOPING REPORT, supra note 101, at 2-2. 
109 Under the Paris Agreement, the Obama Administration pledged to reduce emissions to 26?
28% below 2005 levels by 2025. There is no current mechanism in the coal-leasing process that considers 
climate change impacts or seeks to reduce them. A potential exception comes from the recent Tenth Circuit 
decision in WildEarth Guardians v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., where the court held that the BLM must 
consider greenhouse gas emissions in its NEPA review. 870 F.3d 1222, 1228?1229, 1240 (10th Cir. 2017); 
Court Defends Climate Overturns Massive Coal Mining in Wyoming, WILDEARTH GUARDIANS (Sept. 15, 
2017), http://www.wildearthguardians.org/site/News2?page=NewsArticle&id=13190#.Wz7bLthKjfY 
(on file with author). 
110 JEWELL ORDER, supra note 49, at § 2(b). 
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2018] Taking the Public out of Public Lands 51 
The problems related to fair return present a complicated economics 
puzzle. A 2014 BLM manual and guidebook provided policy guidance (note 
this is agency guidance and not binding law) regarding calculation methods 
for the fair market value of coal leases.111 Unfortunately, there are very few 
bids in the process, making it hard to estimate the fair market values.112 The 
process also fails to account for externalities in setting the fair market 
value.113 Additionally, although regulations set minimum royalty rates, 
royalty rates may go below the mandated minimum where an applicant seeks 
a lease modification or applies for a royalty-rate reduction.114 Studies showed 
that these practices were prevalent.115 There is a minimum bonus rate, of $100 
per acre, which some have labeled ridiculous.116
In January 2016, Secretary Jewell issued Secretarial Order 3338.117 The 
order announced a programmatic environmental review of the coal-leasing 
program alongside what it labeled a ?pause? in issuing new coal leases during 
the pendency of the review process.118 The ten-page order begins by 
explaining the purpose of the Secretary?s actions, stating that the Department 
of the Interior is entrusted with overseeing federal resources for the ?benefit 
of current and future generations.?119 The Secretary asserted that doing so 
involved advancing a ?safe and responsible development of energy? while 
also considering conservation, scientific, historical, and environmental 
values ?for generations to come.?120 Secretary Jewell pointed out that the 
governing regulations for coal leasing dated back to 1979, when our 
understanding of environmental impacts and the contours of the coal industry 
111 BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., U.S. DEP?T OF THE INTERIOR, H-3070-2, ECONOMIC EVALUATION 
OF OIL AND GAS PROPERTIES HANDBOOK.
112 JEWELL ORDER, supra note 49, at § 2(b)(i). 
113 Id.
114 Id.
115 Id.
116 43 C.F.R. § 3473 (2014); Stephen Lacey, Noncompetitive Coal Leasing Policies Cost U.S. 
Taxpayers $29 Billion Since 1982, THINK PROGRESS (June 25, 2012, 8:18 PM), 
https://thinkprogress.org/noncompetitive-coal-leasing-policies-cost-u-s-taxpayers-29-billion-since-1982-
2ebc6ae6a957/; see also Ben Jervis, Subsidized to the End: Not Even Corporate Welfare Can Save Big 
Coal, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 31, 2016, 2:35 PM) https://www.huffingtonpost.com/ben-
jervey/subsidized-to-the-end-not_b_9554742.html; JAYNI FOLEY HEIN & PETER HOWARD,
RECONSIDERING COAL?S FAIR MARKET VALUE: THE SOCIAL COSTS OF COAL PRODUCTION AND THE 
NEED FOR FISCAL REFORM 8 (2015), 
http://policyintegrity.org/files/publications/Coal_fair_market_value.pdf. 
117 The review was about the leasing of the federal mineral estate and contained exceptions for 
Indian lands and actions by OSMRE and ONRR. See generally JEWELL ORDER, supra note 49. 
118 See id. at § 5. 
119 Id. at § 1. 
120 Id.
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were far different from what we encounter today.121 Based on these factors, 
she directed the BLM to prepare a Programmatic Environmental Impact 
Statement (PEIS),122 something that had last been done in the 1970s.123
In explaining her authority for choosing to do a ?discretionary PEIS,?
Secretary Jewell noted that the Department of Interior is authorized to 
undertake the effort based on: 
[I]ts stewardship role as a proprietor and sovereign regulator 
which is charged by Congress with managing and overseeing 
mineral development on public lands not only for the 
purpose of ensuring safe and responsible development of 
mineral resources, but also to ensure conservation of the 
public lands, the protection of their scientific, historic, and 
environmental values and compliance with applicable 
environmental laws.124
These sentiments and those mentioned above mirror the purposes of the 
public lands as articulated by Congress in the Federal Land Policy and 
Management Act (FLPMA).125 Secretary Jewell further explained the 
decision to conduct a PEIS as a statutory duty to ensure a fair return to the 
taxpayer.126 She invoked 1920 Mineral Leasing Act, SMCRA, and 
FLPMA.127
Instead of calling it a moratorium, she labeled her action a ?pause? on 
the issuance of new federal leases.128 As coal leases last over twenty years, 
she felt it was appropriate to determine the impacts and faults with the current 
system before entering into long-term agreements.129 She highlighted that her 
pause on issuing leases is standard procedure followed by the BLM when 
assessing the coal-leasing program.130
Shortly after Secretary Jewell?s order, the BLM began the process for 
completing the PEIS. The first step of a NEPA review is the scoping process 
where the agency in charge of the NEPA review determines the contours of 
the review and the variety of alternatives that will be considered in the final 
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 PEIS SCOPING REPORT, supra note 101, at ES-2. 
124 JEWELL ORDER, supra note 49, at § 4. 
125 43 U.S.C.A. § 1701(a)(8) (West 2014). 
126 JEWELL ORDER, supra note 49, at § 4(b).
127 Id. at § 2(a). 
128 Id. at § 5. 
129 Id.; 43 C.F.R. § 3475.2 (2014) (leases last 20 years or longer). 
130 JEWELL ORDER, supra note 49, at § 4. 
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document.131 As part of the scoping process, the BLM received input from 
over 500 speakers at six public scoping meetings.132 The BLM issued its 
scoping report on January 11, 2017.133 The report concluded that 
modification of the federal coal-leasing program was warranted and 
instructed the PEIS to focus on fair returns, climate change, resource 
management and protection, and improved program administration.134
C. Trump Administration Coal-Leasing Policy 
Coal leasing on public lands has had a renewed life under the Trump 
Administration.135 Once President Trump came into office, the Department 
of the Interior began by assessing the coal-leasing program through two 
memos. The first was completed by acting BLM director Kristin Bail on 
February 9, 2017.136 The Bail memo had five purposes: ?(1) identify the most 
promising areas for coal leasing and development, (2) report on how much 
coal mining is happening and where it is happening, (3) describe current 
regulator activity, (4) identify the coal companies still in business, and (5) 
determine how the BLM could spur coal mining.?137
131 40 C.F.R. § 1501.7 (2014); James TB Tripp & Nathan G. Alley, Streamlining NEPA’s
Environmental Review Process: Suggestions for Agency Reform, 12 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 74 (2003). 
132 In this scoping process, the BLM received 214,886 comments?1,118 of which were unique. 
There were also three external workshops that were held at universities. MICHAEL NEDD, BUREAU OF 
LAND MGMT., RECOMMENDATION TO REVOKE ORDER 3308, (Mar. 28, 2017) (on file with author) 
[hereinafter NEDD MEMO]. 
133 See generally PEIS SCOPING REPORT, supra note 101. 
134 NEDD MEMO, supra note 132, at 1. 
135 Eric Lipton & Barry Meier, Under Trump, Coal Mining Gets New Life on U.S. Lands, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 7, 2017, at A1. 
136 Bail was named Acting Director early in 2017 when her predecessor Neil Kornze stepped down 
with the coming of the new administration. She had long worked for the BLM and other federal and state 
resources agencies. She served only a few months before Michael Nedd was named Acting Director in 
March 2017. He lasted until November 2017. Nedd had previously been acting director of the BLM?s
Office of Energy and Minerals, and his selection was seen as a move to strengthen the role of energy 
extraction on federal lands. Thomas Burr, Interior Names Energy and Mineral Chief New Acting BLM 
Director, SALT LAKE TRIB. (Mar. 15, 2017), 
http://archive.sltrib.com/article.php?id=5062376&itype=CMSID. As of this writing, Brian Steed, BLM?s
Deputy Director for Programs and Policy, is exercising authority of the director. Leadership Overview,
BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., https://www.blm.gov/leadership (last visited Feb. 28, 2018); see Dino 
Grandoni, The Energy 202: New ‘Acting Director’ at Interior Office Worries Public Lands Advocates,
WASH. POST (Nov. 20, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/paloma/the-energy-
202/2017/11/20/the-energy-202-new-acting-director-at-interior-office-worries-public-lands-
advocates/5a12341f30fb045a2e00325c/. As of April 2018, Trump had not yet nominated a new director. 
The Federal Vacancies Reform Act of 1998 allows the president to name acting directors who generally 
serve for no more than 210 days. 5 U.S.C.A. § 3345?46 (West 2014). 
137 BAIL MEMO, supra note 48, at 1. Notice that the tone of the questions assumes that one wants 
to promote mining. Despite the moratorium, the BLM was not discussing whether coal mining should be 
developed, but how best to do so. 
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In her memo, Acting Director Bail described the five areas with the best 
coal potential on federal lands and unsurprisingly, number one was the 
Powder River Basin, where most coal extraction currently occurs.138 She also 
explained that the Powder River Basin used to have a separate regulatory 
requirement relating to a Regional Control Team, an independently 
functioning advisory board made up of federal and state officials.139 The 
BLM and lease applicants had to consult with (and defer to) the team in 
deciding whether a particular coal lease should be processed in a public 
forum. The Bail memo specifically responded to the OIG/GAO Reports from 
2013 that audited the coal-mining process.140 Those reports included twenty-
one recommendations.141 Bail stated that all of the recommendations were 
corrected to the satisfaction of OIG and GAO, and the inquiries from those 
organizations are now closed.142
Bail noted that most actions that could help spur the coal industry are 
beyond the BLM?s control.143 But in looking for some action that would be 
within its purview, she suggested streamlining some of the permit processes, 
removing the Regional Control Team as redundant with other policies (such 
as the NEPA process), and lifting the coal-leasing moratorium.144 While some 
had suggested few coal companies would be interested in filing new lease 
applications, as of February 2017, the BLM was processing twenty-eight 
applications for initial leases and sixteen applications for leases by 
amendment.145 At the time of Bail?s memo, seven (of the forty-four) were on 
hold due to economics.146 The memo also recommends higher staffing levels 
for NEPA compliance as well as removing and updating policies, models, 
and manuals, some of which date back to the 1980s.147
A little over a month later, with new Acting Director Michael Nedd at 
the helm, the Trump Administration released a second memo recommending 
the revocation of the coal-leasing moratorium.148 While the reasoning for 
switching Acting Directors was not publicly explained (and at the time of this 
138 Other sites were the Unita-Piceance Basin, Green River Basin, San Juan Basin, and areas of 
Oklahoma and North Dakota. Id. at 2. 
139 Id. at 3. 
140 Id. at 1. 
141 Id.
142 Id.
143 Id. at 3. 
144 Id. Interestingly, Bail calls it a pause and not a moratorium, potentially based on her longer 
time working at the BLM and her use of the common intra agency terminology. 
145 Id. at 2. 
146 Id.
147 Id. at 4?5.
148 NEDD MEMO, supra note 132, at 1. 
39895-fiu_13-1 sym
posium
 Sheet No. 31 Side A      09/13/2018   14:52:31
39895-fiu_13-1 symposium Sheet No. 31 Side A      09/13/2018   14:52:31
C M
Y K
2018-07-26 OWLEY FINAL(WINDOWS) (DO NOT DELETE) 8/3/2018 7:42 PM 
2018] Taking the Public out of Public Lands 55 
writing, we are on Acting Director number three with Brian Steed),149 the 
elevation of Nedd was likely specifically to explore the development of 
energy on public lands.150
Tasked with developing energy on public lands, Nedd quickly released 
his own memo. In it, he recounted the current progress of the NEPA 
review.151 His analysis of the PEIS scoping report (which stated that review 
of the coal-leasing program was warranted) concluded that a PEIS is not 
warranted.152 Acknowledging that some reforms might be desirable, the Nedd 
memo concluded that a PEIS is not necessary to make needed reforms, 
instead suggesting a BLM program review that would not involve a NEPA 
process or a moratorium on coal leasing.153 Nedd also stated that it was not 
sensible to wait for the completion of the NEPA process because the BLM 
could not possibly complete the PEIS by its initial deadline.154
Nedd acknowledged the concerns with receiving a fair return for the 
nation?s coal.155 While the law requires a fair return, it offers no definition of 
how to determine what is fair. For example, the BLM is not certain as to 
whether it should be accounting for externalities or using a ?carbon adder? to 
calculate the appropriate minimum bids.156 This issue has been a topic of 
conversation for years, Nedd pointed out, including in the 2013 OIG/GAO 
reports.157 However, the OIG and GAO have since given the BLM the green 
light, and the BLM has already implemented several changes, for example, 
149 As Nedd?s appointment was seen as a decision to focus on energy development, arguably 
Steed?s appointment is a shift towards a program of shrinking monuments and transferring public lands, 
things he has advocated for in the past. It is also notable that instead of elevating someone who had been 
a BLM employee for many years, this time Secretary Zinke named someone with greater ties to the states 
(specifically Utah) than to the federal government. Secretary Zinke Names Land Transfer Proponent as 
Acting Director of The Bureau of Land Management, CENTER FOR W. PRIORITIES, (Nov. 16, 2017), 
http://westernpriorities.org/2017/11/16/secretary-zinke-names-land-transfer-proponent-as-acting-
director-of-the-bureau-of-land-management/. 
150 In a statement at the time, Interior Secretary Ryan Zinke said, ?Let me make one thing clear, 
the Interior Department is in the energy business and Mike is an energy guy who understands the balance 
we must strike when developing resources and creating jobs on our public lands.? Thomas Burr, supra
note 136; Scott Streater, BLM’s “Energy Guy” May Signal the End of Big Renewables, E&E NEWS, (Mar. 
31, 2017), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060052439. 
151 NEDD MEMO, supra note 132, at 1. 
152 Id. at 2. 
153 Id. (stating that NEPA review is not the appropriate vehicle to analyze possible reforms because 
BLM has its own review process already examining these issues). 
154 Id.
155 Id. at 3. 
156 Id. at 3-4. 
157 Id. at 3. 
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improving reports, accounting, and public access to documents.158 The BLM 
has also already made changes to the bonus bidding process.159
These memos provided the background for the Trump Administration?s
secretarial order on coal leasing. On March 29, 2017, Secretary of the Interior 
Ryan Zinke revoked the pause, ending the moratorium on issuance of coal 
leases.160 The purpose of the moratorium?s repeal was economic. 
Specifically, the order lifting the ban states that due to ?the critical 
importance of the Federal coal leasing program to energy security, job 
creation, and proper conservation stewardship? the Administration was 
removing the ban.161 Zinke seemed particularly concerned with the length 
and cost of the environmental review process (which he described as costing 
?many millions of dollars? with completion ?no sooner than 2019?).162 Thus, 
not only did the new policy lift the ban on coal leasing, it also halted the 
process of environmental review while suggesting that the Administration 
would still be considering potential improvements to the Federal Coal 
Program.163
While the Zinke memo lists conservation stewardship as one of the 
motivations for revoking the moratorium, it offers no explanation of how 
such a move would be working to improve or protect conservation interests. 
Secretary Zinke based his decision on information from the previous 
executive order, the scoping process, and ?other information provided by 
BLM.?164 The secretarial order describes the decision as ?consistent with the 
principles of responsible public stewardship entrusted to this office.?165
With the pause now on the NEPA process, instead of on the issuance of 
coal leases, the Administration looked to different tools to seek 
improvements and participation in coal leasing.166 Thus, in September 2017, 
the Trump Administration created an advisory committee on coal leasing. A 
158 Id. at 4. 
159 Id.
160 ZINKE ORDER, supra note 48, at 1. 
161 Id.
162 Id.
163 Id.
164 Id.
165 Id.
166 Whether we consider the NEPA process to be paused or completely halted depends on whether 
you think courts (or future administrations) will restart the process. Secretary Zinke declared the NEPA 
process over. Id. at 2. Several environmental groups filed suit in the wake of this announcement, and a 
court could potentially require further NEPA review. See, e.g., Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive 
Relief at 4, Citizens for Clean Energy v. Dep?t of Interior, No. 4:17-CV-00030 (D. Mont. Mar. 29, 2017). 
Additionally, a different presidential administration may seek to recommence NEPA review. Depending 
on the timing and conditions of the coal industry, future NEPA processes may be able to use the already-
completed Scoping Report or a new Scoping Process may need to begin. 
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Department of Interior press release described this move as a ?significant step 
toward restoring public trust.?167 The Department of the Interior suggests that 
the process will modernize land management while building greater trust and 
transparency, describing a main goal of the process as ensuring that both 
taxpayers and Native American tribes get the ?full and fair value? of their 
energy resources.168 The language is couched in economic terms with a focus 
on extraction of value from natural resources. Indeed, although the 
Department suggests a wide-ranging committee would examine various 
aspects of coal leasing, the group is named the ?Royalty Policy 
Committee.?169 Furthermore, its official objectives focus on calculating fair 
market value of resources and ensuring the ?public receives the full value of 
the natural resources produced from Federal Lands.?170
The committee is chaired by Vincent DeVito, an attorney specializing 
in regulatory issues and government affairs.171 The committee has an equal 
number of state and industry members (six each) along with four 
representatives each from tribes and academia.172 Not all states are 
represented. Not all tribes are represented. Eight different federal agencies 
also send representatives.173 There are no nonprofit organizations; notably, 
there are no environmental groups. At the first meeting in October 2017, the 
group formed three subcommittees: (1) Subcommittee on Fair Return and 
Revenue, (2) Subcommittee on Planning, Analysis, and Competitiveness, 
and (3) the Subcommittee on Indian Affairs.174 It is not clear whether the 
planning committee will consider environmental issues and there has not 
been a suggestion that the fair return committee will consider externalities. 
167 Press Release, Secretary Zinke Appoints Members to the Royalty Policy Committee, Announces 
First Meeting, U.S. DEP?T OF THE INTERIOR (Sept. 1, 2017), https://www.doi.gov/pressreleases/secretary-
zinke-appoints-members-royalty-policy-committee-announces-first-meeting. The group had its first 
meeting on October 4, 2017. 
168 Id.
169 U.S. DEP?T OF THE INTERIOR, ROYALTY POLICY COMMITTEE CHARTER 1 (2017), 
https://www.doi.gov/sites/doi.gov/files/uploads/2017_charter_royalty_policy_committee.pdf 
[hereinafter ROYALTY POLICY COMMITTEE CHARTER]. 
170 Id.; Press Release, Secretary Zinke Appoints Members to the Royalty Policy Committee, 
Announces First Meeting, U.S. DEP?T OF THE INTERIOR (Sept. 1, 2017), 
https://www.doi.gov/pressreleases/secretary-zinke-appoints-members-royalty-policy-committee-
announces-first-meeting. 
171 Confidential Interview with a Committee Member.
172 Id.
173 See ROYALTY POLICY COMMITTEE CHARTER, supra note 169, at 2. 
174 Press Release, Readout of the First Meeting of Re-chartered U.S. Interior Royalty Policy 
Committee, U.S. DEP?T OF THE INTERIOR (Oct. 4, 2017), https://www.doi.gov/pressreleases/readout-first-
meeting-re-chartered-us-interior-royalty-policy-committee. 
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While there are complaints about transparency, committee meetings are open 
to the public and available online.175
These movements from the Trump Administration leave us with a coal-
leasing program governed by regulations and royalty rules from the 1970s, 
operations without environmental review, and a stated intention to continue 
evaluating the coal-leasing program while still issuing leases under the old 
system. The progress on such re-evaluation is uncertain. The only clear 
process at the time of this writing is the advisory committee, which even 
committee members view as ineffectual. 
III. NATURAL RESOURCE FEDERALISM AND TRUMPISM
With a basic understanding of the tenets of federalism in the natural 
resources context from section II and a detailed understanding of the federal 
coal-leasing process in section III, we can now contemplate how the coal-
leasing process fits into the federalism ideals of the current Administration. 
Concerns about the federal coal-leasing process and its potential for only 
benefiting a small section of society are not new. We have over fifty years of 
critiques regarding the issuance of leases and calculation of fair market value. 
We have over thirty years of concerns regarding environmental and health 
impacts of coal leasing. On some topics, the Obama and Trump 
Administrations seem to be focusing on repairing similar troubles. Both 
administrations acknowledge a need for comprehensive review of the federal 
coal program to help ensure taxpayers receive a fair return on the value of the 
natural resources. There is marked disagreement, however, in how to go 
about remedying these agreed-upon problems and in who gets to participate 
in the decision-making process. The Obama Administration called for a 
lengthy, time-consuming, and expensive review process. For the three years 
that Interior officials anticipated the review taking, they placed a moratorium 
on issuing new leases. In the early phases of that process, we saw high levels 
of public information and public involvement, with many descriptive orders 
and background reports. The process included participation of different 
stakeholders including tribes, states, energy companies, environmental 
groups, and other interested parties. 
175 Mary Ellen Kustin, Trump Allows Coal Companies To Take Taxpayers For A Ride, Opens Up 
Mining On Public Lands, THINK PROGRESS (Mar. 28, 2017), https://thinkprogress.org/trump-oks-more-
coal-mining-on-public-lands-6ef0d8769be4/. At the second meeting of the committee, the group voted to 
recommend significantly reducing royalty rates for offshore oil and gas production, urged increased 
drilling in the Arctic Wildlife Refuge, and suggested further streamlining of environmental review 
processes. Jennifer A. Dlouhy, U.S. Advisory Panel Pushes for Lower Offshore Oil Royalties,
BLOOMBERG (Feb. 28, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-02-28/lower-offshore-oil-
royalties-urged-by-u-s-advisory-panel. 
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The Trump Administration, by contrast, quickly and without any 
additional public involvement decided to end the environmental review 
process and revoke the moratorium.176 The Trump Administration was able 
to take advantage of reports and processes conducted under the Obama 
Administration, but those reports were largely not written with the idea that 
coal leasing would continue during the review process and, therefore, some 
of the estimates on impacts may not have been adequate. 
The central disagreement between the two administrations seems to 
focus on whether consideration of health and environmental impacts of coal 
should be included in a review of the program, and whether it makes sense 
to continue issuing leases that no one really thinks are fair. A problem with 
lifting the moratorium now is that it keeps the current royalties at the levels 
set over thirty years ago during the last review. 
The approach of the Trump Administration is questionable in light of 
the struggling coal industry, his campaign promises to promote coal at all 
costs, and his decision not to consult with environmental interests. This shift 
is accompanied by rhetoric from the Administration denouncing bureaucracy 
and promoting more local management and decision-making regarding 
natural resources. If the Trump Administration is working based on a 
philosophy that states should be able to make decisions regarding their 
resources, it would make sense to give the states a larger role in the decision 
of when and where coal leases are granted. Perhaps the Administration is 
assuming states simply want immediate monetary returns and, therefore, 
increased coal leasing at all levels is fulfilling state goals even if not directly 
conveying control to states.177 Seen in that lens, the choice to reduce 
bureaucracy is coincident with the view of a federalism that minimizes 
federal involvement and recognizes stronger ideas of state autonomy. 
While federalism and reduced bureaucracy may serve as the external 
justifications of Trump policies, that rationale can be hard to reconcile with 
a decision-making process (and result) that benefits a very small sector?
owners of coal operations. The recent moves from the Department of the 
Interior with both the Zinke Order and the coal-leasing advisory committee 
suggest the Department is running more like a company, setting profit 
maximization over other goals. Voters need to consider whether that is the 
176 The rapid Trump administration process may make the new rules more susceptible to challenge 
because under the Administrative Procedure Act, an agency must show a reasoned basis for policy 
changes. The Fund for Animals v. Norton, 294 F. Supp. 2d 92, 105 (D.D.C. 2003). 
177 The reasoning here may be a bit difficult to parse as all current and previous reports agree that 
the United States (and the states who share in the returns) is receiving well below the value of the resource. 
Delaying or pausing the issuance of coal leases would hopefully lead to leases issued under more favorable 
conditions. But stakeholders need to decide whether they favor getting the maximum return currently 
available or waiting for a process that might ultimately increase their returns. Coal mining states seem to 
be lobbying for the former. 
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right goal, and lawyers should consider whether such an approach aligns with 
federal law.178
If one agrees that profit maximization is the proper goal for the nation?s
coal leasing and federal lands programs, one should still investigate whether 
the methods currently being employed by the Department of the Interior are 
likely to reach that goal. The Interior Department?s approach for re-assessing 
the leasing rates appears to be centered on the coal-leasing advisory 
committee. Yet, the advisory committee does not include a large variety of 
voices, is (as its name implies) merely advisory, and is only required to meet 
twice a year.179 Even members of the committee do not believe that the 
Trump Administration is giving it much attention or respect.  
Outside the Royalty Committee, there may be some internal processes 
occurring that the public has not been privy to. Statements by the Trump 
Administration, however, suggest that the economic accounting will not be 
looking at the full economic costs of the activity.180 For a coal company 
extracting coal from public land, the narrower view of accounting for fair 
market value may be a promising venture. A close look at which 
arrangements will yield the highest royalties might also look good to state 
authorities, who will share in the royalty payments without having any of the 
burdens of being a land manager or owner. But as the holder of the land, the 
federal government should use a different calculus that also considers other 
features like opportunities lost, ability to recover the land, and other issues 
including contamination, protection of historic and cultural sites, waste 
management, and water quality. Indeed, the BLM should consider coal-
178 A report from the New York Times argues that the changes and reversals of the Trump 
Administration can often be tied directly to oil, coal, and gas companies along with other industry groups, 
seeming to indicate that the Trump Administration views such groups as an important constituency whose 
interests should be reflected in administration policy. The Trump Administration has closer relationships 
with industry and energy groups than any previous president. Former EPA Director Pruitt met with them 
almost daily. Nadja Popovich et al., 67 Environmental Rules on Their Way Out Under the Trump 
Administration, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 31, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/10/05/climate/trump-environment-rules-reversed.html. 
179 Although it appears they will meet quarterly. They first met on October 4, 2017 and then again 
on February 28, 2018. Press Release, Readout of the First Meeting of Re-chartered U.S. Interior Royalty 
Policy Committee, U.S. DEP?T OF THE INTERIOR (Oct. 4, 2017), 
https://www.doi.gov/pressreleases/readout-first-meeting-re-chartered-us-interior-royalty-policy-
committee; Dlouhy, supra note 175. 
180 See, e.g., Peter Fairley, States Are Using Social Cost of Carbon in Energy Decisions, Despite 
Trump’s Opposition, INSIDE CLIMATE NEWS (Aug. 14, 2017), 
https://insideclimatenews.org/news/11082017/states-climate-change-policy-calculate-social-cost-carbon 
(describing the Trump Administration?s opposition to accounting for carbon emissions in policy 
decisions); Meredith Fowlie & Mazimilian Auffhammer, Why Rick Perry’s Proposed Subsidies For Coal 
Fail Economics 101, CONVERSATION (Oct. 8, 2017), http://theconversation.com/why-rick-perrys-
proposed-subsidies-for-coal-fail-economics-101-83339 (describing Energy Secretary Rick Perry?s
unusual view of coal mining as having positive instead of negative externalities). 
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leasing operations in the context of its overarching agency mandate to protect 
natural resources.181
Beyond the coal-leasing program, the Trump Administration is also 
adopting other policies to expand the extraction of coal and fossil fuels on 
federal lands. One way it is doing so is by opening up lands that had been 
declared off limits for coal extraction in previous administrations. For 
example, desire for additional available land for fossil fuel extraction appears 
to be one of the driving motivations behind the Administration?s efforts to 
reduce the size of national monuments.182 On December 4, 2017, Trump 
declared that he would reduce Bears Ears National Monument by 85% and 
Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument by nearly 46%.183 At a rally 
announcing the decision, Trump couched the change in policy as a response 
to local needs and interests, stating: ?They don?t know your land, and truly, 
they don?t care for your land like you do.?184 He identified the ?they? in his 
sentence as ?a small handful of very distant bureaucrats located in 
Washington? who control the natural resources of Utah under the previous 
framework.185 On February 2, 2018, the shrinkage of the monuments 
officially occurred and formerly protected lands are now open to new mining 
claims.186 While it is not clear whether there will be many applications for 
permits or leases on these lands, the Utah BLM office has begun preparing 
maps and information for those who are interested in exploring the mineral 
potential of the lands.187 The Utah Division of Oil, Gas, and Mining had not 
received any applications as of February 8, 2018 and doesn?t anticipate new 
claims ?anytime soon.?188
181 43 U.S.C.A. § 1701(a)(8) (West 2017) (?the public lands [are to] be managed in a manner that 
will protect the quality of the scientific, scenic, historical, ecological, environmental, air and atmospheric, 
water r?????????????????????????????????????); id. at § 1732(b) (requiring the prevention of ?unnecessary 
or undue degradation of the lands?). 
182 This parallels efforts to withdraw from previously negotiated plans to protect the sage grouse, 
whose wide range unfortunately overlaps with lands that may not be attractive for hydrofracking. See Bret 
Birdsong, The Grid and the Grouse: Cooperative Federal-State Conservation Planning in the Ages of 
Obama and Trump, 13 FIU L. REV. 103, 115?26 (2018). 
183 Josh Dawsey & Julet Eilperin, Trump Shrinks Two Huge National Monuments in Utah, 
Drawing Praise and Protests, WASH. POST (Dec. 4, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-scales-back-two-huge-national-monuments-in-utah-
drawing-praise-and-protests/2017/12/04/758c85c6-d908-11e7-b1a8-62589434a581_story.html. 
184 Id.
185 Id.
186 Timothy Cama, Trump’s National Monument Rollbacks Take Effect, HILL (Feb. 2, 2018), 
http://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/372007-trumps-national-monument-rollbacks-take-effect. 
187 Id.
188 Josh Siegel, Bears Ears Gets No Mining Applications, WASH. EXAMINER (Feb. 8, 2018), 
http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/bears-ears-gets-no-mining-applications/article/2648556. It seems 
likely that uranium, not coal, will be the natural resources exploited in the area. Id. 
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The Renewable Energy Zones in the California and Arizona deserts are 
also at risk.189 As part of several studies, a long public process, and 
stakeholder negotiations, the BLM established renewable energy zones 
where solar energy development would be promoted and facilitated on 
federal lands with other areas set aside for habitat conservation.190 The Trump 
Administration has announced its intention to change some of the terms of 
the deal and now allow mining on some of the lands targeted for solar 
development.191 Solar development and coal mining will not be able to co-
exist. 
The North Bering Sea example is also an interesting one. On December 
9, 2016, President Obama issued an order seeking to protect the Bering Sea; 
the stated goal of the Obama Policy was to conserve arctic biodiversity, 
tribes, climate, and economy of the area.192 The policy sought to do so by 
enhancing the resilience, and particularly the climate resilience, of the area.193
Obama had invoked section 12(a) of Outer Continental Shelf Leasing Act 
allowing the president to ?withdraw from disposition any of the unleased 
lands.?194 Such withdrawal prevents consideration of the area for future oil 
and gas leasing.195 The Trump Administration quickly took aim at this Obama 
policy to open more areas up to energy extraction as part of his America First 
Offshore Energy Strategy.196
One way to think about these changes is to say that before the current 
Administration, we had a broader sense of who the public was in public lands. 
189 Scott Streater, BLM Proposal Would Revive Mining in Renewable Energy Zone, E&E News 
(Oct. 5, 2017), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060062795. 
190 For detail on the Desert Renewable Energy Conservation Plan, which is also currently at risk, 
see Amy Wilson Morris & Jessica Owley, Mitigating the Impacts of the Renewable Energy Gold Rush,
15 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 293 (2014); Sammy Roth, In Stunning Reversal, Trump Could Open 
California Desert to More Solar and Wind Farms, DESERT SUN (Feb. 2, 2018), 
https://www.desertsun.com/story/news/environment/2018/02/01/trump-could-open-california-desert-
more-solar-and-wind-farms-mining-off-roading/1087021001/; Birdsong, supra note 182, at 114?17. 
191 Streater, supra note 189. 
192 Executive Order, Northern Bering Sea Climate Resilience, Exec. Order 13754, 81 Fed. Reg. 
240 (Dec. 14, 2016); Fact Sheet: White House Announces Actions to Protect Natural and Cultural 
Resources in Alaskan Arctic Ocean, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT  (Dec. 9, 2016), 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=122606. 
193 Northern Bering Sea Climate Resilience Area, OCEANA,  http://usa.oceana.org/northern-
bering-sea-climate-resilience-area (last visited Mar. 6, 2018). 
194 43 U.S.C.A. § 1341(a) (West 2014). 
195 NAT. RES. DEF. COUNCIL & EARTHJUSTICE, BRIEFER ON PRESIDENTIAL WITHDRAWAL UNDER 
OCSLA SEC. 12(A) 1 (2016), https://www.nrdc.org/resources/briefer-presidential-withdrawal-under-
oscla-sec-12a (download the PDF using the link on the right side menu, labelled ?Downloads?) (last 
visited Feb. 23, 2018). 
196 Diana Hacker, Trump Issues Executive Order Revoking Northern Bering Sea Protection and 
Tribal Participation, NOME NUGGET (May 5, 2017), http://www.nomenugget.com/news/trump-issues-
executive-order-revoking-northern-bering-sea-protection-and-tribal-participation. 
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The government?s role is to protect the public lands on behalf of all of the 
people of the nation including those not yet born. The current Administration 
is shifting that in two ways. One way is a traditional republican approach that 
reflects a change in political philosophy?devolving more decision-making 
power to the states. Indeed, this even includes conveying some land to the 
states. It also includes opening public land to use by private individuals (e.g., 
grazing), increasing royalties to states, and working more with the states on 
what their desires for the land and resources might be. While not everyone 
will agree that the states should play a more prominent role in federal land 
policy, (shifting the idea of ?public? from the whole country to those 
geographically linked to the actual land at issue), it is a consistent and 
defendable political choice. Unfortunately, the Trump Administration also 
seems to be privileging another category?business interests. Opening up 
land to greater resource extraction in many places is benefiting the energy-
producing industries that have supported him without providing added 
advantage to the people in the region. The enactment of policies beneficial to 
the coal industry occurs alongside rules that harm coal communities, 
including removing funding for remediation of abandoned mines in the 
President?s budget proposals,197 allowing dumping of debris into nearby 
streams,198 canceling a requirement that oil and gas companies report on 
methane emissions,199 and approving controversial pipelines despite local 
protests and documented spills.200
These policies that seem to privilege very few and both hurt community 
members and diminish public resources leave one to question: who is 
President Trump defining as America when he promises to put the country 
and the people first? 
197 OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, AMERICA FIRST: A BUDGET BLUEPRINT TO MAKE AMERICA 
GREAT AGAIN 27 (2018), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/budget/fy2018/2018_blueprint.pdf. 
198 Jeremy Deaton, Congress is Set to Overturn the Stream Protection Rule, THINK PROGRESS
(Jan. 31, 2017), https://thinkprogress.org/congress-is-set-to-overturn-the-stream-protection-rule-
1829c522f388/#.gixqd6viv. 
199 Popovich et al., supra note 178. 
200 Mayra Cuevas & Steve Almsay, Keystone Pipeline leaks 210,000 Gallons of Oil in South 
Dakota, CNN (Nov. 17, 2017), https://www.cnn.com/2017/11/16/us/keystone-pipeline-leak/index.html; 
Elise Labott & Jeremy Diamond, Trump Administration Approves Keystone XL Pipeline, CNN (March 
24, 2017), https://www.cnn.com/2017/03/23/politics/keystone-xl-pipeline-trump-approve/index.html. 
